Documentation Index
Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://quintsecurity.mintlify.app/llms.txt
Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further.
Status: shipped — Stage 1 in shadow mode. The registry matches in production; outputs feed telemetry. Signature distillation from the GNN is roadmap.
Threat Signatures
Some structural flow patterns are dangerous regardless of the agent’s history. An exfiltration shape is dangerous whether it’s the agent’s first session or its thousandth. Threat signatures provide this shape-based detection without hardcoding specific tool combinations.Signatures Are Shapes, Not Patterns
A signature is NOT “ifread_file then curl = exfiltration.”
A signature IS “the flow matrix has 80%+ of its mass in the read→outbound quadrant.” This catches read_file→curl, query→send_message, fetch→upload, and any other combination that produces the same structural shape.
How Matching Works
Matching uses the same JSD math as the rest of the system, but inverted:| Comparison | HIGH JSD means | LOW JSD means |
|---|---|---|
| Baseline (envelope) | Anomalous — session deviates from learned pattern | Normal |
| Signature (threat) | Normal — session doesn’t match threat shape | Match — structurally similar to known threat |
Built-in Signatures
5 structural shapes shipped with the binary:| ID | Name | Shape | MaxJSD | Severity |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| QT-SIG-001 | Exfiltration | read→send/upload concentrated | 0.30 | Critical |
| QT-SIG-002 | Credential Relay | auth→send/upload concentrated | 0.25 | Critical |
| QT-SIG-003 | Staging + Execution | write→execute concentrated | 0.30 | High |
| QT-SIG-004 | Reconnaissance | read fan-out to many capabilities | 0.35 | Medium |
| QT-SIG-005 | Cover Tracks | read→delete concentrated | 0.25 | High |
Scoped Matching
Signatures can be scoped by agent type and nesting depth:agent_types: empty = universal (all agents). Populated = only for those types.min_depth: 0 = any depth. Populated = only match at that depth or deeper.
min_depth: 2 only fires for sub-agents, not root agents. This differentiates “code agent compiling” (depth 0-1, normal) from “sub-agent privilege escalation” (depth 3+, suspicious).
Signature Validation
All signatures (built-in, loaded from JSON, or pushed by BI Service) are validated:MaxJSDmust be in (0, 0.5] — prevents universal false positivesWeightmust be in [0.1, 1.0] — prevents invisible signalsFlowShapemust have at least one non-zero entryIDandNamemust not be empty
Signature Updates
- Tier 0 (Local)
- Tier 2 (Enterprise)
- Tier 3 (Global)
5 built-in signatures in the binary. For air-gapped deployments, load from JSON file:
Known Limitation: Uniform Flow Evasion
An attacker who distributes actions uniformly across all capability pairs produces high JSD against every concentrated signature (evading all 5). This is by design — concentrated signatures detect concentrated attacks. Defense-in-depth: The baseline divergence check (flow:structural_divergence) fires when a session’s flow deviates from the agent’s normal pattern. An agent that normally does read→read would trigger this signal even with uniform flow. Signatures are the belt; the envelope is the suspenders.
Signature Levels (Future)
| Level | Scope | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Universal | All agents, all orgs | Quint Global + built-in |
| Agent-type | Per platform (claude-code, cursor) | BI Service group analysis |
| Per-agent | Individual baseline | The fingerprint’s FlowMatrix (existing envelope) |